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Abstract
We study how to evaluate allocations independently of individual preferences
over unavailable commodities. We prove impossibility results suggesting that such
evaluations encounter serious diﬃculties. This is related to the well-known problem
of performing international comparisons of standard of living across countries with
diﬀerent consumption goods. We show how possibility results can be retrieved with
restrictions on the domain of preferences, on the application of the independence
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axiom or on the set of allocations to be ranked. Such restrictions appear more
plausible when the objects of evaluation are allocations of composite commodities,
characteristics or human functionings rather than ordinary commodities.
Keywords: consumer preferences, social choice, independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, characteristics, functionings.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers : D63, D71.
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1 Introduction
When a reform of economic policy is considered, welfare economics suggests that it should
be evaluated on the basis of its consequences over the population, taking account of
individual preferences. It usually goes without saying that the preferences taken into
account bear only on the commodities that are available in the options considered. In
this paper we explore the implications of this natural restriction, and show that it is far
from innocuous.
Restricting attention to individual preferences over available commodities appears
to be a matter of practical necessity since very little is known about preferences over
unavailable commodities due to lack of observation of choices. Examples can be drawn
from space and time heterogeneity of commodities. Space diﬀerences are most striking
across distant countries. Japanese preferences over the various kinds of sheep cheese from
diﬀerent valleys in the French Pyrenees are hardly known, and it is no wonder that reforms
in Japan are not evaluated on the basis of the local population’s preferences over these
varieties of cheese. Similarly, French preferences over varieties of sake are diﬃcult to
guess, and reforms in France are never discussed by reference to preferences over sake.
Changes of commodities in time also give obvious examples. Modern preferences over the
use of pigeon post are unknown, and we never hear about preferences concerning pigeon
post nowadays even in the discussion of reforms of the postal service.
Heterogeneity of commodities is also the source of well-known problems in compar-
isons of living standards across space and time. The fact that diﬀerent countries have
diﬀerent consumption goods in their local markets makes it diﬃcult to compare prices,
and the computation of purchasing power parities has to rely on gross approximations.
For instance, the few items that are common in two countries are used to compute indexes
of relative prices for broad categories of goods. A similar problem occurs in time series for
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the evaluation of growth over long periods of time. In this paper, we do not primarily focus
on comparisons across diﬀerent populations, but on the evaluation of diﬀerent allocations
for a given population. The two exercises are nonetheless related since the evaluation
of an allocation for a population usually involves comparing the living standards of its
members. The issue of comparisons will therefore also be addressed here.
In this paper, we examine the possibility of making social evaluations of allocations
on the sole basis of individual preferences over available commodities. More precisely,
we introduce the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIC), stating that
when two allocations have zero quantities of some commodities, the social ranking of the
two allocations should be independent of individual preferences over these commodities.
Our framework is borrowed from the theory of social choice in economic environments,
surveyed, for instance, by Le Breton (1997) and Le Breton and Weymark (2000).
IIC is similar to the well-known condition due to Arrow (1951), Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives (IIA), but it turns out to be much weaker and, we believe, much less
controversial. Let us briefly explain why. IIA states that the ranking of two allocations
should depend only on individual preferences over these two allocations. This requirement
is often implausible, especially in economic environments. For instance, suppose that half
of the population prefers allocation x and half of the population prefers allocation y.
How can we rank x and y with this limited information? Under IIA, we may not explore
whether any one of these allocations is Pareto-eﬃcient, envy-free,1 egalitarian-equivalent,2
or a Walrasian equilibrium with equal budgets because such exploration requires checking
how bundles in x or y are ranked in individual preferences with respect to other bun-
dles. In contrast, IIC allows us to use all the information about individual preferences
1An allocation is envy-free (Foley 1967, Kolm 1972) if no agent prefers another’s bundle to his own.
2An allocation is egalitarian-equivalent (Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) if there exists a bundle x0,
proportional to total consumption, such that every agent is indiﬀerent between his bundle and x0.
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over available commodities, and this is suﬃcient in order to assess whether any of these
allocations is Pareto-eﬃcient, envy-free, and so on.
We may even claim that our condition is actually more faithful to Arrow’s initial
vision. As a defense of his condition for applications to the evaluation of resource alloca-
tions, Arrow wrote (1950, p. 346; see also 1951, p. 73):
‘Suppose that there are just two commodities, bread and wine. A distribution,
deemed equitable by all, is arranged, with the wine-lovers getting more wine
and less bread than the abstainers. Suppose now that all the wine is destroyed.
Are the wine-lovers entitled, because of that fact, to more than an equal share
of bread? The answer is, of course, a value judgment. My own feeling is
that tastes for unattainable alternatives should have nothing to do with the
decision among the attainable ones; desires in conflict with reality are not
entitled to consideration.’
This example suggests that when wine is not available, preferences over wine should
be disregarded. This is exactly what our IIC states, whereas Arrow’s IIA requires much
more. Besides, Arrow’s mention of “equal shares” is in fact an introduction of fairness
considerations which cannot be accommodated within the informational straitjacket of
Arrow’s condition.
We do not consider Arrow’s impossibility theorem to be a serious obstacle to social
choice in economic environments because IIA imposes too severe a restriction on informa-
tion about individual preferences. Unfortunately, as we show, our condition still entails
a similar impossibility result even though it is much weaker than IIA. Combined with a
Pareto condition embodying the respect for unanimous individual preferences, it implies
that the social preference rule must be dictatorial (i.e. social preferences must always
obey one particular agent’s strict preferences) in a large set of cases which is not exactly
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as large as in Arrow’s theorem but still quite substantial. We consider this result to be
much more disturbing than Arrow’s theorem. However, we also examine here how this
diﬃculty can be tackled in order to obtain positive solutions.
Our work is related to the small part of the social choice literature which has been
critical of Arrow’s independence condition and has examined how to construct fair social
preferences when this condition is relaxed. Mayston (1974, 1982), Pazner (1979), Fleur-
baey and Maniquet (2005), Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2005a,b) studied how to
rely on individual indiﬀerence surfaces in order to construct “fair” social preferences.3 In
this literature, the main independence condition, among the less restrictive, allows social
evaluations to use information about the whole indiﬀerence surface of every individual at
the contemplated allocations in order to rank these allocations. As shown by these au-
thors, nice social preference rules can be constructed under this independence condition.
Our IIC is neither weaker nor stronger than this. It allows us to retain information about
the whole preference maps in the subspace of consumed commodities while discarding the
rest of the indiﬀerence surfaces. More closely related to our condition of independence is
Donaldson and Roemer’s (1987) consistency condition, which essentially requires social
evaluations to disregard commodities with identical quantities in the allocations to be
compared. They also derive an impossibility theorem, but their framework is diﬀerent
since it involves utility functions, whereas we consider only ordinal non-comparable pref-
erences. Moreover, their consistency condition is somehow stronger than ours. We only
require social evaluation to disregard individual preferences over commodities with zero
3There is much more extensive literature, initiated by Sen (1970), which also rejects Arrow’s inde-
pendence but proposes to construct social preferences on the basis of interpersonally comparable utility
information instead of additional information about ordinal non-comparable preferences. In this paper we
stick to Arrow’s (1951) purely ordinal approach, which can be defended on various grounds, as discussed
e.g. in Fleurbaey (2003).
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quantities, but require nothing concerning commodities with identical positive quantities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example
conveying the main intuition for our results. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the formal
framework and the main notions. Section 5 states and proves the main result. Section
6 addresses the related issues of subpopulations consuming diﬀerent commodities and
of comparisons of living standards, by introducing a variant of IIC. Since impossibility
results should not stop us from seeking to make good social evaluations, Section 7 examines
the best strategies available in order to obtain social preferences that are not only non-
dictatorial but also satisfy an anonymity requirement.
2 A tale of two commodities
With a simple example, this section shows why it may entail a diﬃculty to require social
evaluations to disregard individual preferences about unavailable commodities. On Robin-
son and Friday’s island, two commodities may be available, bread and wine. Individual
preferences are assumed to be strictly monotonic.
Consider the four allocations described in the following table.
Robinson Friday
bread wine bread wine
x 3 0 7 0
y 7 0 3 0
z 0 4 0 8
w 0 8 0 4
If we rank all allocations, either allocation x is better than allocation y, or conversely,
or they are indiﬀerent. Suppose first that x is better than y for some preference profile
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RN . We now show that, under this assumption, along with the Pareto principle and the
independence requirement that social evaluations disregard individual preferences about
unavailable commodities, for any preference profile R0N , and for any two allocations x
0
and y0 containing only bread such that Friday gets more at x0 than at y0 whereas Robinson
consumes less at x0 than at y0, x0 is better than y0.
To prove the claim, consider the preference profile R∗N such that Robinson’s and
Friday’s preferences rank the above four allocations as follows (in decreasing order):
Robinson Friday
y z
w x
z y
x w
Since individual preferences are strictly monotonic, R∗N agrees withRN on the space of
bread-only allocations. Hence, under our independence requirement and the assumption
that x is better than y for RN , the same must hold for R∗N . We also see that both
individuals prefer z to x and y to w at R∗N . If we respect unanimous preferences (the
Pareto principle), then z is better than x and y is better than w for R∗N . By transitivity
we conclude that z is better than w for R∗N .
Now choose any preference profile R0N and any two bread-only allocations x0 and y0
such that x0R < y
0
R and x
0
F > y
0
F where x
0
R (resp., x
0
F ) denotes Robinson’s (resp., Friday’s)
consumption of bread at x0, and so on.
Consider the preference profile R0∗N such that:
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Robinson Friday
w x0
y0 z
x0 w
z y0
Note that R0∗N agrees with R
∗
N on the space of wine-only allocations, and it also
agrees with R0N on the space of bread-only allocations. Since z is better than w for R
∗
N ,
our independence condition implies that z is better than w for R0∗N . Together with the
Pareto principle and transitivity, we conclude that x0 is better than y0 for R0∗N . Applying
our independence condition to R0∗N and R
0
N , the same holds for R
0
N . Since R
0
N was chosen
arbitrarily, our claim has been proved.
For any bread-only allocations x0 and y0, if x0R > y
0
R and x
0
F > y
0
F , then the Pareto
principle implies that x0 is better than y0. If x0R = y
0
R and x
0
F > y
0
F , then one can consider
y00 such that y00R > x0R = y0R and x0F > y00F > y0F . Then, y00 is better than y0 from the Pareto
principle, and by the above claim, x0 is better than y00. Hence, x0 is better than y0.
We have therefore shown that for any bread-only allocations x0 and y0, if Friday
prefers x0 to y0 (which is equivalent to x0F > y0F ), then x0 is better than y0. That is, Friday
is a “dictator” over all bread-only allocations.
A similar argument starting with the above observation that z is better than w for
R∗N will show that Friday is a “dictator” over all wine-only allocations. It can also be
shown that Friday’s dictatorship extends over comparisons between bread-only allocations
and wine-only ones.
By symmetry, if we assume that y is better than x for some preference profile in
the first place, then we obtain the conclusion that Robinson is a dictator over all one-
commodity allocations. If we assume that x and y are indiﬀerent, then by slightly improv-
9
ing the bundles in x for both agents, we would obtain a similar case as when x is better
than y, and would therefore show again that Friday is a dictator over one-commodity
allocations. But by slightly improving the bundles in y we would obtain that Robinson
is also a dictator over one-commodity allocations. Since these two conclusions are incom-
patible, it is in fact impossible here for the social evaluation to be indiﬀerent between x
and y.
Let us come back to the assumption that x is better than y for at least one prefer-
ence profile. As we have shown, Friday then becomes a dictator over all one-commodity
allocations. Is Friday a dictator over all allocations, not just those with only one com-
modity? Consider any pair of two-commodity allocations a and b. Suppose, for instance,
that Friday prefers a to b. If Robinson prefers a to b as well, we conclude from the Pareto
principle that a is better than b. What if Robinson prefers b to a? Suppose that there is
a pair of bread-only allocations, x0 and y0, such that individual preferences are as follows:
Robinson Friday
y0 a
b x0
a y0
x0 b
Since Friday is a dictator for one-commodity allocations, the social ranking of x0 and
y0 conforms to Friday’s preferences. Together with the Pareto principle and transitivity, we
can conclude that a is better than b. It seems that Friday is a dictator for all allocations,
including two-commodity allocations.
This conclusion, however, would be hasty. Suppose that Robinson prefers the two-
commodity bundle b to all bundles containing only one commodity. Then it is impossible
to find a one-commodity allocation y0 better than b for him, and the above reasoning
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fails. It is then indeed possible to rank b above a, against Friday’s preference. Friday’s
dictatorship need not extend to all allocations. This appears to depend on whether agents
can reach arbitrarily high indiﬀerence curves with a reduced number of commodities.
This simple example provides intuition for the main elements of our analysis: 1)
the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Commodities may still entail dictatorship,
especially for allocations with missing commodities; 2) non-dictatorial social evaluation
is however possible in some cases; 3) a key fact is whether individuals, according to their
own preferences, can find better bundles containing fewer commodities.
3 Framework
Let L := {1, . . . , c} be the set of commodities, and N := {1, . . . , n} the set of agents,
where 2 ≤ c < ∞ and 2 ≤ n < ∞. Denoting R+ the set of all non-negative real
numbers, Rc+ is the set of all consumption bundles. Agent i’s consumption bundle is a
vector xi := (xi1, ..., xic) ∈ Rc+. An allocation is a vector x := (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rcn+ . The set
of all allocations is Rcn+ . The set of allocations such that no individual bundle xi is equal
to the zero vector is denoted X, i.e., X :=
¡
Rc+ \ {0}
¢n .
In order to study allocations in which some of the c commodities are absent, we
introduce the following notion of a subspace. For each K ⊆ L, define RK+ ⊆ Rc+ by
RK+ := {q ∈ Rc+ | ∀k ∈ L\K, qk = 0}.
Notice that RK+ is a subset of Rc+, so that q ∈ RK+ is a full vector with c components,
some of which are simply null. Let RK++ denote the subset of RK+ containing bundles such
that all commodities in K are in positive quantity.
An ordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. For each i ∈ N , agent i’s
preference relation is a complete ordering Ri on Rc+, that is, on i’s personal bundles.
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This means that, as is standard in microeconomics, we restrict attention to self-centered
preferences. The strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation associated to
Ri are denoted Pi and Ii, respectively. Let R be the set of continuous, convex, and
strictly4 monotonic preference relations. A profile of preference relations is a list RN :=
(R1, ..., Rn) ∈ Rn.
A social ordering function is a mapping Ψ defined on Rn, such that for all RN ∈ Rn,
Ψ(RN) is a complete ordering on the set of all allocations Rcn+ . Ψ(RN) is interpreted as
the social ordering of all allocations when agents’ preferences are RN . We simply denote
by R (with no subscript) the social ordering Ψ(RN), by R0 the social ordering Ψ(R0N),
and so on, when no confusion may arise.
We will repeatedly require the social ordering function to obey the Weak Pareto
condition saying that unanimous strict preference must be respected. This is a very basic
condition of respect of individual preferences. It is especially compelling when dealing,
as here, with self-centered preferences. It then means that individuals are sovereign over
their personal consumption.
Weak Pareto: ∀RN ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ , if ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi yi, then xP y.
We also need to define the notion of dictatorship, and we propose a definition that
encompasses situations where the dictator dictates only in a subset of cases. Let D be
a subset of Rn and Y a subset of Rcn+ . We say that an agent i0 ∈ N is a dictator over
(D, Y ) for the social ordering function Ψ if for all RN ∈ D, and all x, y ∈ Y, xi0 Pi0 yi0
implies xP y. When there is such an agent, the social ordering function Ψ is said to be
dictatorial over (D,Y ). Clearly, since a dictator over (D, Y ) is also a dictator over any
(D0, Y 0) with D0 ⊆ D and Y 0 ⊆ Y, the larger the sets D and Y, the greater the extent of
dictatorship.
4For a discussion of the role of strict monotonicity in our analysis, see the appendix.
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4 Suﬃcient and dispensable commodities
The example in Section 2 tells us that it is important to see whether an agent can find
better bundles with fewer commodities. In this section we introduce the corresponding
definitions.
Let K ⊆ L be a set of commodities, and let i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R be given. We call K
a suﬃcient set for Ri if all bundles in Rc+ can be surpassed in preference by bundles in
RK+ :
∀xi ∈ Rc+,∃yi ∈ RK+ , yiRi xi.
Otherwise, it is called an insuﬃcient set. In the latter case, one can say that satisfaction
is “bounded” in RK+ , in the sense that there are some indiﬀerence surfaces for Ri that
cannot be surpassed in preference by any bundle of RK+ . For instance, with only water,
bread and log cabins, satisfaction may be bounded, so that this set of three commodities
is insuﬃcient. In contrast, with all the sorts of commodities typically available in a given
country, one can obtain every possible level of satisfaction, so that this forms a suﬃcient
set.
WhenK is a suﬃcient set, we say that the complement setM = L\K is a dispensable
set . Indeed, this means that satisfaction is not bounded in the absence of the commodities
inM. Conversely, when satisfaction is bounded in the absence of commodities inM,M will
be called an indispensable set. For instance, apple fritters and skating may be dispensable
for some preferences, whereas water and newspapers may be indispensable for these same
preferences. The following table summarizes these notions.
Satisfaction is bounded in RK+ Satisfaction is not bounded in RK+
K is insuﬃcient K is suﬃcient
L \K is indispensable L \K is dispensable
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IfK is suﬃcient (resp., indispensable) forRi, then anyK 0 ⊇ K is also suﬃcient (resp.,
indispensable) for Ri. If K is insuﬃcient (resp., dispensable) for Ri, then any K 0 ⊆ K is
also insuﬃcient (resp., dispensable) for Ri. The set L is suﬃcient and indispensable for all
preference relations in R. Notice that the complement of a suﬃcient (resp., dispensable)
set need not be insuﬃcient (resp., indispensable).
These notions may be of some interest for consumer theory. This theory contains
the notion of an essential commodity, that is, a commodity such that without it, utility
(or production when it is about a production function) is at the smallest level. Though
the notions introduced above deal with possibly high levels of satisfaction, there is an
obvious link: An essential commodity is necessarily indispensable. A commodity that is
not essential, however, may still be indispensable.
5 Independence of Irrelevant Commodities
As explained in the introduction, we require the social ranking of two allocations to depend
only on individual preferences for commodities that are available in these allocations.
Formally, our condition states that a change of individual preferences for unavailable
commodities should not alter the social ranking. Or, equivalently, if two preference profiles
agree on all of (RK+ )n, then for any x, y ∈ (RK+ )n, the social rankings for these profiles
agree on {x, y}.
Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIC): ∀RN , R0N ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ , if
∃K ⊆ L such that x, y ∈ (RK+ )n and ∀i ∈ N , Ri and R0i agree on RK+ , then R and R0 agree
on {x, y}.
Our IIC condition is logically weaker than Arrow’s IIA condition, which requires
that for any given pair of allocations, a change of individual preferences about a third
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allocation should not alter the social ranking between the given two allocations.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): ∀RN , R0N ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ , if
∀i ∈ N , Ri and R0i agree on {x, y}, then R and R0 agree on {x, y}.
The informational basis on which the desirability of allocations is assessed is much
expanded with IIC, compared to IIA. As we mentioned in the introduction, under IIC we
may examine whether an allocation is Pareto-eﬃcient, envy-free, egalitarian-equivalent,
or Walrasian with equal budgets, whereas under IIA such examination is impossible.
Moreover, under IIC, we may measure an “intensity” of individual preferences for x over
y in a similar fashion as with the Borda rule in the voting context, whereas this cannot
be done under IIA. For instance, consider two allocations x, y ∈ (RK+ )n. Take a reference
bundle x0 ∈ RK++, and define
vRi(xi;x0) = min {λ ∈ R+ | λx0Ri xi} .
Then, the diﬀerence vRi(xi;x0) − vRi(yi;x0) may be interpreted as a kind of “intensity”
of individual preferences for x over y, and such information may be used in order to rank
x and y, while obeying IIC.
Arrow’s theorem, adapted to this framework, states that a social ordering function
satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA must be dictatorial over (Rn,X).5 As we show below, this
impossibility no longer holds when IIA is replaced by IIC, but we still obtain dictatorship
in a substantial set of cases, corresponding to certain subsets of profiles of preferences and
of allocations, which we now define.
5Arrow’s (1950) initial presentation of his theorem was already dealing with our economic framework,
but the rigorous proof of his theorem for economic models owes much to Kalai et al. (1979) for the case
of public goods, and Bordes and Le Breton (1989) for that of private goods. As first noticed by Border
(1983), dictatorship is obtained for X only, because, by monotonicity of preferences, the zero bundle is
never part of a free triple (see the appendix for a definition of this notion).
15
Let D− ⊆ Rn denote the subset of profiles such that there is a proper subset K ( L
that is suﬃcient (and its non-empty complement is dispensable) for all i ∈ N. Formally:
D− := {RN ∈ Rn | ∃K ⊆ L,K 6= L,∀i ∈ N, K is suﬃcient for Ri}
= {RN ∈ Rn | ∃M ⊆ L,M 6= ∅,∀i ∈ N, M is dispensable for Ri} .
Let X be the subset of X such that at least one commodity is absent from the allocation,
i.e.
X :=
(
x ∈ X |
X
i∈N
xi /∈ Rc++
)
.
Our main result can now be stated. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 1 If a social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and Independence of
Irrelevant Commodities, then there is an agent who is a dictator for this social ordering
function over (D−,X) and over (Rn, X).
Compared with dictatorship over (Rn,X) in Arrow’s theorem, we see that dictator-
ship still prevails when restricting attention either to the set of preference profiles D− or
to the set of allocations X.
In the appendix, we also show that the above theorem is “tight” in the sense that D−
is a maximal domain of dictatorship for X, and that X is a maximal scope of dictatorship
for Rn. More precisely, we exhibit a social ordering function that is not dictatorial over
({RN}, X) for every RN ∈ D+ := Rn \ D−, and another social ordering function that is
not dictatorial over (Rn, {x, y}) for every pair {x, y} ⊆ X \ X except those such that
xi > yi for all i ∈ N or xi < yi for all i ∈ N,6 and those such that xi = yi for some i ∈ N.7.
6Vector inequalities are denoted À, >,and ≥.
7When xi > yi for all i ∈ N , monotonicity of preferences and Weak Pareto imply xP y for all profiles,
and since all agents agree with this ranking, every agent is formally a dictator over (Rn, {x, y}) . When
xi = yi, agent i is a dictator over (Rn, {x, y}) because the implication xi Pi yi ⇒ xP y is vacuously true.
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Whether we derive a negative or a positive implication from these results depends on
how the concept of a commodity is defined. In Debreu (1959, p. 24), it is defined
‘by a specification of all its physical characteristics, of its availability date,
and of its availability location. As soon as one of these three factors changes,
a diﬀerent commodity results.’
If we consider individual preferences over commodities defined in this way, then it is
clear that almost every commodity is dispensable for every individual, so that D− is the
appropriate domain of preferences. It is also obvious that there are commodities that no
individual in a particular country or period can consume (e.g., people staying in Japan
can never consume bread available in France) in which case X is the relevant range of
allocations. Hence, Arrow’s impossibility remains valid with the weaker IIC axiom in this
context.
However, if we consider composite commodities, then it becomes less likely that all
individuals have the same dispensable commodities, and the likelihood depends on how
broadly we define composite commodities. For instance, various kinds of fruit may be
dispensable whereas “fruit” may not be. When we define composite commodities in a
suﬃciently broad sense, we are no longer trapped in dictatorship.
Thus, the above results delineate the borderline in model specification which divides
possibility and impossibility of non-dictatorial social choice.
These results, however, are not the end of our investigation. The examples of social
ordering functions that are used to check tightness of Theorem 1 are not appealing since
they are still dictatorial over substantial subsets of allocations or of preference profiles,8
8More precisely, for any given RN ∈ D+, dictatorship over
¡{RN}, X¢ extends to all allocations in
X \X that are ranked below some allocations in X by all agents (but does not extend to all allocations in
X \X). Similarly, for any given {x, y} ⊆ X \X, dictatorship over (D−, {x, y}) extends to all preference
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and hence do not satisfy an anonymity requirement. The construction of anonymous
social ordering functions will be investigated in the final section.
6 Heterogeneous subpopulations
In the previous section, we focused on the diﬃculty of evaluating allocations in a country
or at a particular period that arises from the fact that not all conceivable commodities
are available in the country or at the period. In this section, we consider diﬃculties due
to the fact that diﬀerent subpopulations may consume diﬀerent commodities. This issue
becomes especially relevant if we want to evaluate “global” allocations in the world or
growth paths over several generations. For instance, the evaluation of world allocations
has to be done with Japanese preferences over Japanese commodities, French preferences
over French commodities, and so on.
This issue is also connected to the problem of comparing living standards across space
or time. The comparison of living standards across subpopulations is not the same exercise
as ranking allocations for the global population, but the latter does involve comparing the
situation of subpopulations. Suppose that we are interested in the comparison of France
and Japan. A social evaluation of the world allocations will normally provide us with
data for such comparison. For instance, consider the social ordering function introduced
by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and Pazner (1979), based on the notion of egalitarian-
equivalence. Given a fixed reference bundle x0 ∈ Rc+, this social ordering function is
defined as follows: xRy if and only
min
i∈N
vRi(xi;x0) ≥ mini∈N vRi(yi;x0)
profiles RN ∈ D+ such that both x and y are ranked below some allocations in X by all agents (but does
not extend to all profiles in D+). See the appendix.
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where vRi(·;x0) is defined as in Section 5. This amounts to comparing individual situations
by the minimal fraction of x0 that individuals would be willing to substitute for xi, and
applying the maximin criterion to the vector of such individual measures. We can then also
compare the distribution of these indexes in two populations. This is only an example,9
but it shows how comparisons are linked to general criteria of social evaluation.
Our IIC condition does not capture the problem raised in this section because every
commodity is consumed by someone in the world (or by some generation in the intertem-
poral context). In order to formalize this issue, we examine the idea of applying the inde-
pendence requirement in a decentralized way: When two allocations give a zero quantity
of some commodity to an individual, the decentralized version of IIC says that the social
evaluation should not depend on his preferences for this commodity. For simplicity, we
formalize the condition in terms of individuals rather than subpopulations, but the axiom
and the analysis can be adapted to subgroups as we will see later.
Individual Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIIC): ∀RN , R0N ∈ Rn,
∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ , if ∀i ∈ N , ∃Ki ⊆ L such that xi, yi ∈ RKi+ and Ri and R0i agree on RKi+ , then
R and R0 agree on {x, y}.
IIIC is logically stronger than IIC because if the hypothesis of IIC holds, then that
of IIIC holds, but not vice versa. We next show that with IIIC, dictatorship extends
to a larger preference domain and to a larger set of allocations than with IIC. On this
preference domain, every agent has her own suﬃcient set of commodities with which her
satisfaction is not bounded. Formally, we define the new domain of preference profiles as
9This social ordering function has been axiomatically characterized by Fleurbaey (2005) and Tadenuma
(2005). These axiomatic studies may provide some justifications for comparing living standards by these
indexes.
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follows.
D−∗ := {RN ∈ Rn | ∀i ∈ N, ∃K ⊆ L,K 6= L, K is suﬃcient for Ri} .
It follows that D−∗ ) D− since by allowing heterogeneity of suﬃcient subsets across
individuals, we do not bar the former homogeneous configuration.
Let us also introduce the set of allocations in which no individual consumes all com-
modities:
X :=
©
x ∈ X | ∀i ∈ N, xi /∈ Rc++
ª
.
Notice that X ) X. The restriction on allocations in X seems very natural. Indeed, no
ordinary individual would consume all commodities in the real world.
We then obtain the following variant of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 If a social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and Individual Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Commodities, then there is an agent who is a dictator for this social
ordering function over (D−∗, X) and over (Rn,X).
The above theorem is also tight in the sense that D−∗ is a maximal domain of
dictatorship for X, and that X is a maximal scope of dictatorship for Rn. That is,
there exist a social ordering function that is not dictatorial over ({RN},X) for every
RN ∈ D+∗ := Rn \ D−∗, and another social ordering function that is not dictatorial over
(Rn, {x, y}) for every pair {x, y} ⊆ X \X except those such that xi > yi for all i ∈ N or
xi < yi for all i ∈ N, and those such that xi = yi for some i ∈ N .
IIIC may be criticized for restricting information about individual preferences too
much. In fact, there are several diﬀerent situations where individuals have zero units
of a certain good: (i) people are simply not interested in the good and the good is not
available in the local market, (ii) the good is available in the local market, but a particular
individual does not want to consume it, or (iii) the good is normally available in the
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local market and everyone needs it, but it is in a serious shortage at a particular period
(such as food during a period of famine). One may argue, for instance, that Japanese
preferences over commodities that are normally unavailable in the Japanese market have
to be ignored (case (i)), but if a particular individual in Japan does not consume sodas,
which are available in the Japanese market, this tells something about her preferences
about sodas, and it should be taken into account (case (ii)). Under IIIC, however, the
individual’s preferences for sodas are ignored in this context. The following subgroup (as
opposed to individual) version of the independence condition would remedy this problem.
Let {S1, ..., Sm} be a partition of the whole population N .
Subgroup Independence of Irrelevant Commodities: ∀RN , R0N ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ ,
if ∀T ∈ {S1, ..., Sm}, ∃KT ⊆ L such that ∀i ∈ T , xi, yi ∈ RKT+ and Ri and R0i agree on
RKT+ , then R and R0 agree on {x, y}.
As already explained, we have adopted the individual version for simplicity. The
subgroup version makes more room for possibility and less room for impossibility than
in Theorem 2, and the larger each subgroup is, the more room we obtain for possibility.
Formally, the theorem would hold on a domain between D− and D−∗, and closer to D−
when independence is defined for larger subgroups, i.e. a coarser partition of N . A similar
remark applies to the set X.
As for case (iii) above, one may argue that preferences for food during a period of
famine should be taken into account when evaluating social desirability of allocations.
Even IIC, however, requires that social rankings of allocations be independent of such
preferences. We can take care of this problem with a slight weakening of the condition,
allowing social orderings to depend not only on the available goods but also on those
goods that are “familiar” to individuals. This extension of the informational basis of
social ordering functions will be discussed in the next section in more details.
21
Another remark should be made on the informational basis of social ordering func-
tions under the independence condition. In the introduction, IIC has been contrasted with
IIA by noticing that with IIC, but not with IIA, it is possible to refer to eﬃciency and
fairness properties of allocations. On this account, IIIC occupies an intermediate position
between IIA and IIC. To see this, consider world allocations in which the French and the
Japanese consume diﬀerent fixed subsets of commodities. The smaller the intersection of
these subsets, the harder it is to assess eﬃciency and equity properties of such allocations.
In the extreme case when the intersection is null, i.e. when they consume totally diﬀer-
ent commodities, it is then impossible to know, for instance, whether a French envies a
Japanese on the sole basis of her preferences over French commodities.
7 Anonymous social ordering functions
In this final section, we explore the possibility of social ordering functions that are not
only non-dictatorial, but also anonymous. The anonymity requirement on which we focus
here is the mild condition that when two agents have the same preferences, it should be
a matter of social indiﬀerence to permute their bundles, since, apart from their names,
these agents are identical.
Anonymity: ∀RN ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈ Rcn+ , ∀i, j ∈ N, if Ri = Rj, yi = xj, yj = xi and
∀k 6= i, j, yk = xk, then x I y.
In order to obtain possibility results, social choice theory often looks at preference
domain restrictions. But in the present case, there seems to be little hope for obtaining
anonymous social ordering functions by only restricting the preference domain. In partic-
ular, the restriction to D+ does not suﬃce. Consider a two-agent (Robinson, Friday) and
c-commodity economy, which relates to the example in Section 2. In D+ and, presumably,
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in every reasonable domain D, one can find two subsets K,K 0 ⊆ L such that K ∩K 0 = ∅,
and a profile (RR, RF ) such that RR and RF agree on RK+ and on RK
0
+ separately but not
on RK+ ∪ RK
0
+ , so that there are two pairs q, q0 ∈ RK+ and s, s0 ∈ RK
0
+ ranked as follows:
q0 PR s0 PR sPR q and s0 PF q0 PF q PF s. Consider the following allocations:
Robinson Friday
x q q0
y q0 q
z s s0
w s0 s
Suppose that there exists a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto, IIC and
Anonymity. Then, by IIC and Anonymity, we have x I y as well as z I w since these pairs
of allocation simply permute bundles for agents with identical preferences on the relevant
subspace. But by Weak Pareto, z P x and y P w, and together with x I y and transitivity,
we have z P w, which is a contradiction.
Whenever we find the above configuration somewhere in the space of allocations,
we are unable to construct anonymous social preferences. The key fact underlying this
example is that even though the two preference relations agree on each subspace, one is
more sensitive than the other to diﬀerences in one subspace as compared to diﬀerences
in the other subspace. It seems diﬃcult to imagine a reasonable domain restriction that
would preclude variations of sensitiveness across subspaces.
Preference domain restrictions, therefore, are not eﬀective to obtain anonymous so-
cial ordering functions unless they are supplemented by other restrictions. We consider
two kinds of additional restrictions here. The first is to restrict the application of the
independence condition to certain commodities. The second is to restrict the set of al-
locations to be ranked by the social ordering function. We now show that combining
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a domain restriction with one or the other additional restriction provides two ways of
obtaining a solution.
The key idea in these two strategies is to consider a “core” subset K0 of commodities.
Both restrict the domain to preferences for which this subset is suﬃcient:
DK0 := {RN ∈ Rn | ∀i ∈ N, K0 is suﬃcient for Ri}.
Then we define two social ordering functions, Ψ∗K0 and Ψ
∗∗
K0, defined on DK0 as follows.
Take a vector x0 ∈ RK0++. Because K0 is a suﬃcient subset of commodities, the index
vRi(·;x0) introduced in Section 5 is always well defined. Like the Pazner-Schmeidler
social ordering function, both Ψ∗K0 and Ψ
∗∗
K0 rank allocations by the following rule: xR y
if and only if mini∈N vRi(xi;x0) ≥ mini∈N vRi(yi;x0).10
The diﬀerence betweenΨ∗K0 andΨ
∗∗
K0 lies in the following. For allRN ∈ DK0,Ψ∗K0(RN)
ranks all the allocations in Rcn+ , whereas Ψ∗∗K0 is defined so as to only rank the allocations
belonging to the subset XK0 of allocations in which all commodities in K0 are consumed
in positive quantity:
XK0 := {x ∈ Rcn+ | ∀k ∈ K0,
X
i∈N
xik > 0}.
The social ordering function Ψ∗K0 violates IIC and IIIC, but satisfies a weak version
of these axioms, requiring that the social ranking of any two allocations should remain the
same only when individual preferences over consumed commodities11 and the commodities
in K0 are unchanged.
The social ordering function Ψ∗∗K0 satisfies IIC because commodities in K0 are never
absent in the allocations it ranks, so that the changes of preferences that are relevant
10In this way, these social ordering functions are not only anonymous but can also be considered “fair”
in relation to the egalitarian-equivalent concept of fairness.
11That is, commodities consumed by society in the weak version of IIC, and consumed by the individual
in the weak version of IIIC.
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to IIC never alter the preferences on the subspace RK0+ , and hence the indices vRi(·;x0),
either. By restricting further the set of allocations ranked by the social ordering function
to those such that every agent consumes all commodities in K0, one can obtain a third
social ordering function satisfying IIIC.
Whether these solutions are applicable or not in any specific context depends on the
possibility of finding an appropriate core subset K0 of commodities. The subset K0 must
not only be rich enough to justify the preference domain restriction DK0, but it must also
be either “familiar” enough to justify the above weakening of the independence axioms,
or “common” enough to justify the restriction of the set of allocations to be ranked by
the social ordering function.
As in Section 5, let us briefly explore the implications of these results for model
specification in social evaluation. Once again, perspectives are bleak with ordinary com-
modities. The diversity of commodities is simply overwhelming, so that it is hopeless to
seek a core subset of ordinary commodities.
A better outlook appears when the objects of individual preferences are not ordinary
commodities, but composite commodities. The more broadly the composite commodities
are defined, the easier one can find a subset of composite commodities that are familiar
or common as well as suﬃcient for all individuals. A drawback of composite commodities
is that individual preferences over them are consistent only under severe restrictions.
One must assume either that prices are fixed over all contemplated allocations, or that
preferences are separable. Moreover, the more broadly the composite commodities are
defined, the more severe the problem is.
At this point it is interesting to consider the alternative concepts of characteristics
(Lancaster, 1971) or functionings (Sen, 1985). Both have the interesting feature that
a given characteristic or functioning can be obtained with very diﬀerent commodities.
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Moreover, these concepts are closely related to the physiology of human beings, which
suﬀers less from variations across space and time than the list of commodities. As a
consequence, it appears more promising, with characteristics or functionings, to find a
suﬃcient “core” of dimensions for which either (i) preferences can always be estimated,
justifying the restriction on the independence axioms, or (ii) consumption is always posi-
tive, justifying the restriction on the set of allocations to be ranked. As a simple example,
consider the following (incomplete) list of functionings related to food: living without
calorie deficiency, protein intake, entertaining others in a social meeting, etc. These basic
functionings can be obtained at similar levels with very diﬀerent types of food. They are
present in positive quantities for all human beings in ordinary conditions, and even when
they are absent, they are so familiar that individual preferences over them could always
be estimated.
In general, the space of characteristics or functionings might be as diverse as the
space of commodities. Indeed, Sen (1992) defines a functioning as any kind of achieve-
ment (“beings” and “doings”) of a person. Therefore, we cannot claim that substituting
functionings for commodities automatically eliminates the diﬃculties discussed in this pa-
per. Nevertheless, focusing on basic or core characteristics or functionings, we can make
some of the routes toward possibility easier to trod than with commodities. If that is true,
a main conclusion emerging from the present analysis is that welfare economics would find
better prospects for the construction of appealing criteria to evaluate social states if it
migrated from the space of commodities to the space of characteristics or to the space of
functionings.
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Appendix: Proofs
Some additional notations are needed. For any Ri ∈ R and any xi ∈ Rc+, the (closed)
upper contour set for Ri at xi is defined as
uc(xi;Ri) :=
©
yi ∈ Rc+ | yiRi xi
ª
.
For any xi ∈ Rc+, the cone generated by xi is defined as
C(xi) :=
©
yi ∈ Rc+ | ∃α ∈ R+, yi = αxi
ª
.
In the proofs we sometimes consider social ordering functions defined on subdomains
(i.e. proper subsets of Rn). When we say that they satisfy an axiom, this means that
they satisfy the axiom on their subdomain.
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove separately dictatorship over (D−, X) and over¡Rn, X¢ . The proof relies on Arrow’s theorem, and we need to define a variant of IIA.12
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA): ∀RN , R0N ∈ Rn, ∀x, y ∈
X, if ∀i ∈ N , Ri and R0i agree on {x, y}, and for no i, xi Ii yi, then R and R0 agree on
{x, y}.
For any K ⊆ L, let RK ⊆ R denote the set of preference relations for which K is
suﬃcient.
12Our proof is influenced by Bordes and Le Breton (1989), who themselves adopt the “local approach”
developed in Kalai et al. (1979). But we take advantage of a precise framework, whereas Bordes and Le
Breton prove general results applying to several economic domains, and our much weaker independence
condition requires new arguments.
29
Lemma 1 Let K ( L be given. On the domain (RK)n, if a social ordering function
satisfies Weak Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisfies Weak
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let RN , R0N ∈ (RK)n and x, y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N , Ri
and R0i agree on {x, y}, and for no i ∈ N , xi Ii yi. Assume that xP y.
Let M := L\K. Since x, y > 0, by strict monotonicity of preferences we know that
yi Pi 0 and xi P 0i 0 for all i ∈ N. Since K is suﬃcient for all i, by strict monotonicity and
continuity of preferences we can choose z, w, z0, w0 ∈ (RK+ \ {0})n such that for all i ∈ N ,
(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P 0i yi as well), then zi Pi xi Pi yi Piwi and xi P 0i z0i P 0i w0i P 0i yi,
(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P 0i xi as well), then yi Piwi Pi zi Pi xi and w0i P 0i yi P 0i xi P 0i z0i,
and
(iii) there are λi, λ0i ∈ R++ such that wi = λizi, w0i = λ0iz0i.
By Weak Pareto, we have z P x and y P w. By transitivity of P , z P w. It also follows
from Weak Pareto that xP 0 z0 and w0 P 0 y.
Next, choose a, b, a0, b0, a00, b00 ∈ (RM+ \ {0})n such that for all i ∈ N ,
(i) if xi Pi yi, then a0i > a00i > ai > bi > b00i > b0i, and
(ii) if yi Pi xi, then bi > b00i > b0i > a0i > a00i > ai. and
(iii) there are μi, μ0i ∈ R++ such that bi = μiai, b0i = μ0ia0i.
For every i ∈ N, choose two increasing functions γi, γ0i : R+ → R+ such that γi(0) =
γ0i(0) = 0, γi(1) = γ0i(1) = 1 and γi(λi) = μi, γ0i(λ
0
i) = μ0i. Such functions always exist
because λi > 1⇔ μi > 1 and λ0i > 1⇔ μ0i > 1.
Let R0 ∈ R be an arbitrary preference relation on Rc+. We now define a new pref-
erence relation for i, R∗i , as follows. The upper contour set for R∗i at any q ∈ C(zi) such
that q = αzi for some α is constructed as
uc(q;R∗i ) := co
©¡
uc(q;Ri) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(γi(α)ai;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
,
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where co denotes the convex hull. More generally, for any c ∈ Rc+, we define
uc(c;R∗i ) :=
\
q∈C(zi),c∈uc(q;R∗i )
uc(q;R∗i ).
As a convex hull, uc(q;R∗i ) is convex for all q ∈ C(zi), and as an intersection of convex
sets, uc(c;R∗i ) is convex for all c ∈ Rc+. This means that R∗i is convex. Clearly, it is also
continuous and strictly monotonic, so that R∗i ∈ R. Moreover, R∗i agrees with Ri on RK+ .
Indeed, if c ∈ RK+ ,
uc(c;R∗i ) ∩RK+ =
\
q∈C(zi),c∈uc(q;R∗i )
uc(q;R∗i ) ∩RK+
=
\
q∈C(zi),c∈uc(q;Ri)∩RK+
uc(q;Ri) ∩ RK+
= uc(c;Ri) ∩RK+ .
Similarly, R∗i agrees with R0 on RM+ . Finally, zi I∗i ai, because
uc(zi;R∗i ) ∩RM+ = co
©¡
uc(zi;Ri) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(γi(1)ai;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
∩ RM+
= co
©¡
uc(zi;Ri) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(ai;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
∩RM+
= uc(ai;R0) ∩ RM+ ,
and wi I∗i bi, because
uc(wi;R∗i ) ∩RM+ = co
©¡
uc(wi;Ri) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(γi(λi)ai;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
∩RM+
= co
©¡
uc(wi;Ri) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(bi;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
∩RM+
= uc(bi;R0) ∩RM+ ,
Similarly, we construct R0∗i ∈ R by
uc(q;R0∗i ) := co
©¡
uc(q;R0i) ∩RK+
¢
∪
¡
uc(γ0i(α)a
0
i;R0) ∩RM+
¢ª
for q ∈ C(z0i), q = αz0i, and
uc(c;R0∗i ) :=
\
q∈C(z0i),c∈uc(q;R0∗i )
uc(q;R0∗i ).
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for any c ∈ Rc+. The ordering R0∗i agrees with R0i on RK+ , and with R0 on RM+ . Moreover,
z0i I 0∗i a0i and w0i I 0∗i b0i. Since both R∗i and R0∗i agree with R0 on RM+ , they agree with each
other on RM+ as well. Let R∗N := (R∗1, . . . , R∗n) and R0∗N := (R0∗1 , . . . , R0∗n ). By construction,
R∗N , R
0∗
N ∈ (RK)n .
Recall that a00i > ai and bi > b00i . By transitivity and strict monotonicity of preferences,
a00i P ∗i zi and wi P ∗i b00i for all i ∈ N . By Weak Pareto, a00 P ∗ z and wP ∗ b00. Since z P w, it
follows from Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIC) that z P ∗w. By transitivity
of R∗, we have a00 P ∗ b00.
Next recall that a0i > a00i and b00i > b0i. By transitivity and strict monotonicity of
preferences and Weak Pareto, z0 P 0∗i a00 and b00 P 0∗i w0. On the other hand, it follows from
IIC and a00 P ∗ b00 that a00 P 0∗ b00. By transitivity of P 0∗, z0 P 0∗w0. From IIC (applied to R0∗N
and R0N), we have z
0 P 0w0. Recall that xP 0 z0 and w0 P 0 y. By transitivity, xP 0 y.
We have shown that xP y ⇒ xP 0 y. By symmetry, xP 0 y ⇒ xP y, and y P x ⇔
y P 0 x. Hence, it also holds that x I y ⇔ x I 0 y.
Let D ⊆ Rn and Y ⊆ X be given. An agent i0 ∈ N is called a quasi-dictator
over (D, Y ) if for all RN ∈ D, and all x, y ∈ Y, xP y whenever xi0 Pi0 yi0 and for no
i ∈ N, xi Ii yi.13 In the sequel, when D is not specified for a quasi-dictator or a dictator,
this means that the domain of the social ordering function is the relevant set. A pair
of allocations {x, y} ⊆ X is called a trivial pair on D if there is i ∈ N such that for
all RN , R0N ∈ D, Ri and R0i agree on {x, y}. By strict monotonicity of preferences, this
happens when either x > y or x < y. A set of three allocations {x, y, z} ⊆ X is called
a free triple on D if for every n-tuple of orderings ON on {x, y, z}, there exists RN ∈ D
such that RN and ON agree on {x, y, z}.
13This was called a “strict dictator” in Redekop (1991), where a similar strategy of proof relying on
linear orders was introduced.
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Lemma 2 Let K ⊆ L be given. On the domain (RK)n , if a social ordering function
satisfies Weak Pareto and Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then for every
free triple {x, y, z} ⊆ X, there exists a quasi-dictator over {x, y, z}.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a social ordering function defined on (RK)n that satisfies
Weak Pareto and WIIA. Let {x, y, z} ⊆ X be a free triple on (RK)n and let
¡L{x,y,z}¢n be
the set of all profiles of linear orders (i.e., complete orderings without indiﬀerence) over
{x, y, z}.
Consider two profiles RN , R0N ∈ (RK)n that generate the same linear orders over
{x, y, z}, i.e. for all a, b ∈ {x, y, z} such that a 6= b, for all i ∈ N one has
aPi b⇔ aP 0i b.
By WIIA, the social ordering function yields the same ranking of {x, y, z} for RN and
R0N . This means that this social ordering function induces a well-defined social ordering
function on
¡L{x,y,z}¢n . The induced social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and
IIA on this domain. By application of the variant of Arrow’s theorem for linear orders,
the induced social ordering function has a dictator i0 over {x, y, z}.
This implies that i0 is a quasi-dictator over {x, y, z} for the initial social ordering
function defined on (RK)n.
Lemma 3 Let K ⊆ L be given. Let {x, y} , {z, w} ⊆ X be non-trivial pairs on (RK)n .
There exist v1, ..., vm ∈ X such that
v1 = x, v2 = y, vm−1 = z, vm = w
and for all q = 1, ...,m− 2, {vq, vq+1, vq+2} is a free triple on (RK)n .
Proof of Lemma 3. Since {x, y} is a non-trivial pair, there exists p ∈ Rc++ such that
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px = py. Let
x0 =
2
3
x+
1
3
y,
y0 =
1
3
x+
2
3
y.
For every ε ∈ R++ there exist x00, y00 ∈
¡
Rc++
¢n
such that kx00 − x0k < ε, ky00 − y0k < ε
(where k.k denotes the Euclidean norm), and {x, y, u}, {v, x00, y00} are free triples for
every u ∈ {x00, y00} and v ∈ {x, y} . Similarly, one constructs z00, w00 ∈ ¡Rc++¢n such that
{z, w, u}, {v, z00, w00} are free triples for every u ∈ {z00, w00} and v ∈ {z, w} .
The pairs {x00, y00} , {z00, w00} are non-trivial, with x00, y00, z00, w00 ∈ ¡Rc++¢n . Pick i ∈ N.
Let p¯, p¯0 ∈ Rc++ be such that p¯x00i = p¯y00i and p¯0z00i = p¯0w00i . Consider the set
Bi =
©
q ∈ Rc++ | p¯q > p¯x00i , p¯0q > p¯0z00i , q ≯ x00i , y00i , z00i , w00i
ª
.
Because x00i , y00i , z00i , w00i À 0, there exist p¯00 ∈ Rc++ and q0i, q00i ∈ Bi such that
p¯00q0 = p¯00q00 < p¯00x00i , p¯
00y00i , p¯
00z00i , p¯
00w00i .
This construction can be made for every i ∈ N. One can check that {x00, y00, u} ,
{z00, w00, u} and {v, q0, q00} are free triples for every u ∈ {q0, q00} and v ∈ {x00, y00, z00, w00} .
One can now connect {x, y} , {z, w} by the following sequence of free triples:
{x, y, x00} , {y, x00, y00} , {x00, y00, q0} , {y00, q0, q00} , {q0, q00, z00} , {q00, z00, w00} , {z00, w00, z} ,
{w00, z, w} .
Lemma 4 Let K ⊆ L be given. Let RN ∈ (RK)n and x, y ∈ X be such that for no i ∈ N,
xi Ii yi. Then, there exists z ∈ X such that {x, z} and {z, y} are non-trivial on (RK)n
and for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yi Pi zi Pi xi.
Proof of Lemma 4. Pick i ∈ N and assume, without loss of generality, that xi Pi yi.
First case: xi > yi. Suppose, again without loss of generality, that xi1 > yi1.
34
First subcase: yi1 > 0. One can find ε, η ∈ R++ such that
zi = (yi1 − ε, xi2 + η, yi3, ..., yic)
satisfies xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Second subcase: yi1 = 0 and (without loss of generality) yi2 > 0. One can find
ε, η ∈ R++ such that
zi = (xi1 + ε, yi2 − η, yi3, ..., yic)
satisfies xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Second case: xi ≯ yi. For λ ∈ (0, 1) , let
zi = λxi + (1− λ) yi.
By convexity of preferences, for λ close enough to 0, one has xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Lemma 5 Let K ⊆ L be given. On the domain (RK)n , suppose that for every free triple
{x, y, z} ⊆ X, there is a quasi-dictator over {x, y, z} . Then there is a quasi-dictator over
X.
Proof of Lemma 5. Pick any triple {a, b, c} ⊆ X that is free on (RK)n and let i0
be its quasi-dictator on (RK)n. Let RN ∈ (RK)n and x, y ∈ X be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0
and for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. By Lemma 4, there is z ∈ X such that {x, z} and {z, y} are
non-trivial on (RK)n and for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yi Pi zi Pi xi. In particular,
one has xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0.
By Lemma 3, there exist v1, ..., vm ∈ X such that
v1 = a, v2 = b, vm−1 = x, vm = z
and for all q = 1, ...,m−2, {vq, vq+1, vq+2} is a free triple on (RK)n . Similarly, there exist
w1, ..., wt ∈ X such that
w1 = a, w2 = b, wt−1 = y, wt = z
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and for all q = 1, ..., t− 2, {wq, wq+1, wq+2} is a free triple on (RK)n .
Necessarily i0 is a quasi-dictator for all {vq, vq+1, vq+2}, for q = 1, ...,m − 2, as well
as for all {wq, wq+1, wq+2}, for q = 1, ..., t− 2. This implies that i0 is a quasi-dictator over
{x, z} and over {z, y} . Therefore, xP z and z P y. By transitivity, xP y.
Lemma 6 Let K ⊆ L be given. On the domain (RK)n , if i0 ∈ N is a quasi-dictator over
X, then i0 is a dictator over X.
Proof of Lemma 6. Let x, y ∈ X andRN ∈ (RK)n be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 . By continuity
and strict monotonicity of preferences, there exists z ∈ X such that xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0 and
for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yiRi xi Pi zi. It follows that xP z (by Weak Pareto)
and z P y (because i0 is a quasi-dictator). By transitivity, xP y.
We can now complete the proof of dictatorship over (D−, X). Note that D− =S
K(L (RK)n . Consider a social ordering function Ψ defined on Rn that satisfies Weak
Pareto and IIC. For everyK ( L, its restriction ΨK to the subdomain (RK)n also satisfies
these conditions. It follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 5 and 6 that for every K ( L, ΨK has a
dictator iK over X. This implies that for Ψ, for every K ( L there is a dictator iK over
((RK)n , X) . Suppose that there are K,K 0 ( L such that iK 6= iK0 . Let x, y ∈ X and
RN ∈
T
K(L,K 6=∅ (RK)n be such that xiK PiK yiK and yiK0 PiK0 xiK0 . (Such a configuration
is easy to obtain since any profile of linear preferences with positive normals belongs toT
K(L,K 6=∅ (RK)n .) One must have xP y and y P x, which is impossible. Therefore the
same agent must be the dictator for all K ( L, i.e. on D−. This proves that there is a
dictator over (D−, X).
Remark. This impossibility result no longer holds if the set R is extended to
include preference relations that are monotonic but not strictly. Let A(RN) =
{x ∈ X | ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi 0} and B(RN) = {x ∈ X | ∃i ∈ N, xi Ii 0} . Consider the follow-
ing social ordering function: for all x, y ∈ Rcn+ , xR y whenever one of the conditions
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below holds:
(i) x ∈ A(RN) and y ∈ B(RN);
(ii) x, y ∈ A(RN) and x1R1 y1;
(iii) x, y ∈ B(RN) and x2R2 y2.
This social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and IIC, but is not dictatorial. How-
ever, this example obviously displays clear dictatorial features, and the essence of our
results does not really depend on strict monotonicity of preferences. In particular on the
subdomain of D− (extended to cover preferences that are not strictly monotonic) such
that for every i ∈ N, and every xi > 0, xi Pi 0, the dictatorship result is preserved.
Remark. The proof involves only profiles from D−. Therefore, it also shows that a social
ordering function defined on the subdomain D− and satisfying Weak Pareto and IIC has
a dictator over X.
The proof of dictatorship over
¡Rn,X¢ relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 7 Let K ( L, K 6= ∅ be given. On the domain Rn, if a social ordering function
satisfies Weak Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisfies Weak
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives restricted to allocations in
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
.
Proof of Lemma 7: Let x, y ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
and RN , R0N ∈ Rn be such that for all
i ∈ N, Ri and R0i agree on {x, y} and for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Let M := L \ K. Suppose
xP y.
By a similar method as in the proof of Lemma 1, one constructs R∗N , R0∗N ∈ Rn and
a, a0, a00, b, b0, b00 ∈ RM+ \ {0} such that for all i ∈ N :
(i) if xi Pi yi then a0i > a00i > ai > bi > b00i > b0i;
(ii) if yi Pi xi then bi > b00i > b0i > a0i > a00i > ai;
(iii) Ri and R∗i agree on RK+ ;
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(iv) R0i and R0∗i agree on RK+ ;
(v) R∗i and R0∗i agree on RM+ ;
(vi) xi I∗i ai and yi I∗i bi;
(vii) xi I 0∗i a0i and yi I 0∗i b0i.
By Weak Pareto, a00 P ∗ x and y P ∗ b00. By IIC, xP ∗ y so that a00 P ∗ b00. By IIC again,
a00 P 0∗ b00. By Weak Pareto, xP 0∗ a00 and b00 P 0∗ y so that xP 0∗ y. By IIC, xP 0 y. As in
Lemma 1, one then easily deduces that R and R0 agree on {x, y} .
Lemma 8 Let K ( L, with cardinality |K| > 1. On the domain Rn, if a social or-
dering function satisfies Weak Pareto and Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
restricted to allocations in
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
, then there is a dictator over
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n .
This lemma can be proved as in the sequence of Lemmas 2, 5 and 6.
Lemma 9 Let K ( L, |K| = 1. On the domain Rn, if a social ordering function satisfies
Weak Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then there is a dictator over¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n .
Proof of Lemma 9: By IIC and monotonicity of preferences, the social ranking over¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
does not depend on individual preferences. Consider x, y, z, w ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
such that for every i ∈ N, xi ≷ yi if and only if zi ≷ wi and for no i ∈ N, xi = yi.
Let K 0 ⊆ L \ K, |K 0| = 1. Let a, b ∈ ¡RK0+ \ {0}¢n be such that for every i ∈ N ,
xi ≷ yi if and only if ai ≷ bi. Suppose xP y. One can construct RN ∈ Rn such that
for every i ∈ N, either ai Pi xi Pi yi Pi bi or yi Pi bi Pi ai Pi xi. By Weak Pareto, aP x and
y P b, so that by transitivity, aP b. By IIC and monotonicity of preferences, this ranking
does not depend on individual preferences since a, b ∈
¡
RK0+ \ {0}
¢n
and |K 0| = 1. By a
similar reasoning, one can show that aP b implies z P w. Similarly, if y P x, one proves
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that wP z. In summary, xP y if and only if z P w, and y Rx if and only if wRz. Let us
call this property “neutrality”.
The rest of the proof mimics part of the proof of Arrow’s theorem (see, e.g., Sen
1970, ch. 3*). We present it for completeness. Take any G ⊆ N such that for all
x, y ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , x P y if xi > yi for all i ∈ G. (This property holds for G = N by
Weak Pareto.) Partition G into non-empty subsets G1 and G2. Let x, y ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
be
such that xi > yi for all i ∈ N \G2 and xi < yi for all i ∈ G2. Construct z ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
such that xi > yi > zi for all i ∈ G1, xi < zi < yi for all i ∈ G2 and zi > xi > yi for all
i ∈ N \ G. One has y P z because yi > zi for all i ∈ G. Now, either xP z or z Rx. In
the former case, by neutrality this implies that for all a, b ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , a P b whenever
ai > bi for all i ∈ G1 and ai < bi for all i ∈ N \ G1. In the latter, this implies y P x, so
that by neutrality, for all a, b ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , a P b whenever ai > bi for all i ∈ G2 and
ai < bi for all i ∈ N \G2.
Let us pursue the former case. (A similar argument applies to the other case.) Let
a, b ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
be such that ai > bi for all i ∈ G1. Take c ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
such that
ai > ci > bi for all i ∈ G1 and ci > max {ai, bi} for all i ∈ N \ G1. Since ai > ci for all
i ∈ G1 and ci > ai for all i ∈ N \ G1, aP c and by Weak Pareto, c P b, implying aP b.
Therefore, for all a, b ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , a P b whenever ai > bi for all i ∈ G1.
Repeating this argument, one ultimately finds a subset containing a single individual
i0 such that for all a, b ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , a P b whenever ai0 > bi0. That is the dictator.
Lemma 10 On the domain Rn, if a social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and
for every K ( L, K 6= ∅, there is a dictator over ¡RK+ \ {0}¢n , then there is a dictator
over X.
Proof of Lemma 10: First we prove that the same dictator rules over every
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n .
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Case 1: c ≥ 3. Suppose not, with i1 being a dictator over
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n
and i2 over¡
RK0+ \ {0}
¢n . Let K 00 ( L be such that K∩K 00 6= ∅ and K 0∩K 00 6= ∅, with i3 the dictator
over
¡
RK00+ \ {0}
¢n
. Since
¡
RK∩K00+ \ {0}
¢n ⊆ ¡RK+ \ {0}¢n ∩ ¡RK00+ \ {0}¢n , both i1 and
i3 must be dictators over
¡
RK∩K00+ \ {0}
¢n , implying i1 = i3. Similarly i2 = i3, so that
i1 = i2. This proves that there is only one dictator i0.
Case 2: c = 2. By Lemma 9, there is a dictator i1 over (R++ × {0})n. Let x, y ∈
({0} ×R++)n be such that xi1 > yi1. Then, there exist z, w ∈ (R++ × {0})n such that
for all i ∈ N , (i) if xi > yi, then zi > wi, and (ii) if xi ≤ yi, then zi < wi. One can
construct R0N ∈ Rn such that for all i ∈ N , either xi Pi zi Piwi Pi yi or wi Pi yiRi xi Pi zi.
In particular, zi Pi1 wi. Since i1 is a dictator over (R++ × {0})n, one has z P w. By Weak
Pareto, xP z and wP y. By transitivity, xP y. By IIC and monotonicity of preferences,
this ranking does not depend on individual preferences since x, y ∈ ({0} ×R++)n. This
means that i1 is a dictator over ({0} ×R++)n as well.
Next, let x, y ∈ X and RN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 . Let K,K 0 be such that
x ∈
¡
RK+ \ {0}
¢n , y ∈ ¡RK0+ \ {0}¢n. We have to prove that xP y. Let z ∈ ¡RK0+ \ {0}¢n
be such that xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i 6= i0, xi Pi zi (this is possible by continuity and
the fact that xi Pi 0). Because i0 is a dictator over
¡
RK0+ \ {0}
¢n , z P y, while xP z by
Weak Pareto. Therefore xP y by transitivity.
This proves that there is a dictator over
¡Rn,X¢ .
Notice that D− ∩Rn = D− and X ∩X = X, and for any i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, there
exist RN , R0N ∈ D− and x, y ∈ X such that xi Pi yi while yj Pj xj. If the dictator over
(D−, X) and the dictator over (Rn, X) were diﬀerent, it would be impossible to always
adopt the strict preferences of both of them as strict social preferences. Hence, they must
be the same agent. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We now show the tightness of Theorem 1, as announced in Section 5. For any
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RN ∈ D+ = Rn \ D−, define the following correspondences:
Xi(k) =
n
xi ∈ Rc+ | ∀yi ∈ RL\{k}+ , xi Pi yi
o
I(k) = {i ∈ N | Xi(k) 6= ∅} ,
K(i) = {k ∈ L | i ∈ I(k)} .
Since RN ∈ D+, I(k) 6= ∅ for all k ∈ L and
S
i∈N K(i) = L. Let us also prove that for all
i ∈ N and all k ∈ K(i), the set Xi(k) is closed (possibly empty), and if it is non-empty,
it is equal to uc(xki ;Ri) for some xki ∈ Rc+. Take any sequence (zti)t∈N in Xi(k) which
converges to some zi ∈ Rc+. Assume that there is yi ∈ R
L\{k}
+ such that yiRi zi. Then, by
strict monotonicity of preferences, there is y0i ∈ R
L\{k}
+ such that y0i Pi zi. By continuity of
preferences, there is t ∈ N such that y0i Pi zti , contradicting the fact that zti ∈ Xi(k). This
proves that Xi(k) is closed. Moreover, for all zi, z0i ∈ Rc+, if z0i ∈ Xi(k) and ziRi z0i, then
zi ∈ Xi(k). Take any zi ∈ Xi(k) and let
xki = min {α ∈ R+ | αzi ∈ Xi(k)} zi.
By construction, xki ∈ Xi(k), and for any x0i ∈ Rc+ such that x0iRi xki , x0i ∈ Xi(k).
Conversely, for any x0i ∈ Xi(k), x0iRi xki . For otherwise, if xki Pi x0i, there exists α0 <
min {α ∈ R+ | αzi ∈ Xi(k)} such that α0zi Pi x0i, implying that α0zi ∈ Xi(k), contradict-
ing the fact that α0 < min {α ∈ R+ | αzi ∈ Xi(k)} .
Let
ucki =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Xi(k) if i ∈ I(k)
Rc+ if i /∈ I(k),
and
uci =
\
k∈L
ucki .
By construction, for each i ∈ N, there is xi ∈ Rc+ such that uci = uc(xi;Ri).14 As
14If i /∈ I(k) for all k ∈ L, then uci = uc(0;Ri).
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a consequence, for any x ∈
Q
i∈N uci and any y /∈
Q
i∈N uci, there is i ∈ N such that
xiRi xi Pi yi, implying that y does not Pareto-dominate x.
If K(i) 6= ∅ and xi ∈ uci, then for all k ∈ K(i), xi ∈ ucki = Xi(k). Therefore, for all
yi ∈ RL\{k}+ , xi Pi yi, so that necessarily xi /∈ R
L\{k}
+ . In summary, one has xik > 0 for all
xi ∈ uci and all k ∈ K(i). Since
S
i∈N K(i) = L, one then has
P
i∈N xi À 0 whenever
xi ∈ uci for all i ∈ N. Therefore, for all K ( L and all x ∈ (RK+ )n, x /∈
Q
i∈N uci.
We can now define the social ordering Ψ(RN) as follows, for any RN ∈ Rn. Choose
a reference bundle x0 ∈ Rc++. For all x, y ∈ Rcn+ , xR y if one of the following conditions
holds:
(i) RN ∈ D+, x, y ∈
Q
i∈N uci and mini∈N vRi(xi;x0) ≥ mini∈N vRi(yi;x0), where
vRi(yi;x0) is defined as in Section 5;
(ii) RN ∈ D+, x ∈
Q
i∈N uci and y /∈
Q
i∈N uci;
(iii) RN ∈ D+, x, y /∈
Q
i∈N uci and x1R1 y1;
(iv) RN ∈ D− and x1R1 y1.
We check the properties of this social ordering function. Transitivity: For any RN ,
this social ordering is transitive because, in the case of RN ∈ D+, it partitions the set Rcn+
into two subsets,
Q
i∈N uci and its complement, ranks all allocations in
Q
i∈N uci above the
others, and espouses transitive rankings within each subset. Weak Pareto: No allocation
from the complement of
Q
i∈N uci can Pareto-dominate an allocation in
Q
i∈N uci, and the
specific rankings for
Q
i∈N uci and its complement satisfy Weak Pareto. IIC : For any for
K ( L, if x, y ∈ (RK+ )n and if RN , R0N ∈ D+, necessarily x, y /∈
Q
i∈N uci, so that when
RN and R0N agree on RK+ , obviously R1 and R01 agree on {x, y}, and the corresponding
social orderings do as well. A similar argument applies when RN , R0N ∈ D−. When
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RN ∈ D+, R0N ∈ D−, in both cases 1 dictates and the same argument applies again.
Non-dictatorship: It is clear that, for every RN ∈ D+, this social ordering function is not
dictatorial over ({RN},X) .
We now provide an example of a social ordering function that is not dictatorial over
(Rn, {x, y}) for every pair {x, y} ⊆ Rcn+ \X, except those such that xi > yi for all i ∈ N
or xi < yi for all i ∈ N, and those such that xi = yi for some i ∈ N. Let N∗(RN) ⊆ N be
the set of all i ∈ N such that Ri is strictly convex, when there are such agents, and let
N∗(RN) = N, otherwise. Modify the definition of the previous social ordering function
by changing only part (i):
(i) RN ∈ D+, x, y ∈
Q
i∈N uci and mini∈N∗(RN ) vRi(xi;x0) ≥ mini∈N∗(RN ) vRi(yi;x0);
We only check non-dictatorship. Take a pair x, y ∈ Rcn+ \X such that it is not the
case that xi > yi for all i ∈ N or xi < yi for all i ∈ N, or xi = yi for some i ∈ N .
There is RN ∈ Rn such that x, y ∈
Q
i∈N uci, every Ri is strictly convex, and some agents
prefer x while all the others prefer y. Now, by slightly altering the convexity of RN
without changing how every agent ranks xi, yi and without upsetting x, y ∈
Q
i∈N uci, one
can modify N∗(RN) at will and obtain either xP y or y P x, so that no agent acts as a
dictator.
Proof of Theorem 2: For dictatorship over (D−∗,X), the only part of the proof of The-
orem 1 that needs substantial change is the proof of Lemma 1, which is now reformulated
as follows. (The other lemmas used to prove Theorem 1 need to be changed in an obvious
way to account for the person-specific nature of the Ki.)
Lemma 11 For each i ∈ N, let Ki ( L be given. On the domain
Q
i∈N RKi, if a
social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and Individual Independence of Irrelevant
Commodities, then it satisfies Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
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Proof of Lemma 11. Let RN , R0N ∈
Q
i∈N RKi and x, y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ri and R0i agree on {x, y}, and for no i ∈ N , xi Ii yi. Assume that xP y. For each i ∈ N,
define Mi := L \Ki 6= ∅. Let R00N be such that for each i ∈ N, every K ⊆ L with K 6= ∅
is suﬃcient for R00i (for instance, this holds for a profile of linear preferences with positive
normals), and Ri and R00i agree on {x, y}.
Let i ∈ N be given. Since x, y > 0, by monotonicity of preferences we know that
yi Pi 0 and xi P 00i 0. We can choose zi, wi, z0i, w0i ∈ RKi++ such that:
(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P 0i yi as well), then zi Pi xi Pi yi Piwi and xi P 00i z0i P 00i w0i P 00i yi,
(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P 0i xi as well), then yi Piwi Pi zi Pi xi and w0i P 00i yi P 00i xi P 00i z0i,
and
(iii) there are λi, λ0i ∈ R++ such that wi = λizi, w0i = λ0iz0i.
Next, choose ai, bi, a0i, b0i, a00i , b00i ∈ RMi++ such that:
(i) if xi Pi yi, then a0i > a00i > ai > bi > b00i > b0i, and
(ii) if yi Pi xi, then bi > b00i > b0i > a0i > a00i > ai, and
(iii) there are μi, μ0i ∈ R++ such that bi = μiai, b0i = μ0ia0i.
Let R0 ∈ R be an arbitrary preference relation on Rc+. As in the proof of Lemma 1,
we can construct a preference relation R∗i ∈ R such that:
(i) R∗i and Ri agree on R
Ki
+ .
(ii) R∗i and R0 agree on R
Mi
+ .
(iii) zi I∗i ai and wi I∗i bi.
Similarly, we construct R00∗i ∈ R such that:
(i) R00∗i and R00i agree on R
Ki
+ .
(ii) R00∗i and R0 agree on R
Mi
+ .
(iii) z0i I 00∗i a0i and w0i I 00∗i b0i.
Notice that R∗i and R00∗i agree on R
Mi
+ because they both agree with R0.
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Having defined zi, wi, z0i, w0i ∈ RKi++, ai, bi, a0i, b0i, a00i , b00i ∈ RMi++, R∗i and R00∗i for every
i ∈ N, we obtain allocations z, w, z0, w0, a, b, a0, b0, a00, b00 ∈ Rc+ and preference profiles
R∗N := (R
∗
1, . . . , R∗n) and R00∗N := (R
00∗
1 , . . . , R00∗n ). By construction, R∗N , R
00∗
N ∈
Q
i∈N RKi .
By Weak Pareto, we have z P x and y P w. By our supposition, xP y. Hence, tran-
sitivity of P implies z P w. On the other hand, for every i ∈ N, since a00i > ai, bi > b00i ,
zi I∗i ai and wi I∗i bi, strict monotonicity and transitivity of preferences imply a00i P ∗i zi and
wi P ∗i b00i . By Weak Pareto, a00 P ∗ z and wP ∗ b00. It follows from z P w and Individual
Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIIC) that z P ∗w. By transitivity of R∗, we
have a00 P ∗ b00.
Similarly, by Weak Pareto, xP 00 z0 and w0 P 00 y. By transitivity, strict monotonicity
of preferences and Weak Pareto, we have z0 P 00∗ a00 and b00 P 00∗w0. On the other hand, it
follows from a00 P ∗ b00 and IIIC that a00 P 00∗ b00. By transitivity of P 00∗, z0 P 00∗w0. From IIIC
(applied to R00∗N and R
00
N), we have z
0 P 00w0. By transitivity, xP 00 y.
We have shown that xP y ⇒ xP 00 y. By symmetry, xP 00 y ⇒ xP y, and y P x ⇔
y P 00 x. Hence, it also holds that x I y ⇔ x I 00 y. This means that R and R00 agree on
{x, y}.
By a similar reasoning, we can prove that R0 and R00 agree on {x, y}. Therefore R
and R0 agree on {x, y}.
The proof of dictatorship over
³
Rn, X
´
has exactly the same structure as the corre-
sponding part of the proof of Th. 1. We first have the following lemma.
Lemma 12 On the domain Rn, if a social ordering function satisfies Weak Pareto and
Individual Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisfies Weak Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives restricted to allocations in X.
Proof of Lemma 12: Let RN , R0N ∈ Rn and x, y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N , Ri
and R0i agree on {x, y}, and for no i ∈ N , xi Ii yi. Assume that xP y.
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For every i ∈ N, if xi Pi yi then let Ki = {k ∈ L | xik > 0} and if yi Pi xi then let
Ki = {k ∈ L | yik > 0} . Let Mi = L \Ki. Since x, y ∈ X, we know that Ki,Mi 6= ∅.
Since xi, yi > 0, by strict monotonicity of preferences we know that yi Pi 0 and xi P 0i 0
for all i. We can choose z, w, z0, w0 ∈
Q
i∈N R
Ki
+ such that for all i ∈ N ,
(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P 0i yi as well), then zi Pi xi Pi yi Piwi and xi P 0i z0i P 0i w0i P 0i yi,
(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P 0i xi as well), then yi Piwi Pi zi Pi xi and w0i P 0i yi P 0i xi P 0i z0i,
and
(iii) there are λi, λ0i ∈ R++ such that wi = λizi, w0i = λ0iz0i.
Next, choose a, b, a0, b0, a00, b00 ∈
Q
i∈N R
Mi
+ such that for all i ∈ N ,
(i) if xi Pi yi, then a0i > a00i > ai > bi > b00i > b0i,
(ii) if yi Pi xi, then bi > b00i > b0i > a0i > a00i > ai, and
(iii) there are μi, μ0i ∈ R++ such that bi = μiai, b0i = μ0ia0i.
The rest of the argument is as in the proof of Lemma 11.
The rest of the proof applies without change for the case c ≥ 3. When there are
only two commodities, a more direct proof is necessary because there are no free triples.
Indeed, in this case, in X any individual bundle has only one commodity with a positive
quantity, so that for any triple of bundles, there are at least two bundles with the same
commodity. Strictly monotonic preferences rank this pair of bundles according to their
respective quantity for this commodity.
Here is a proof for c = 2. By Lemmas 9 and 10 and the fact that IIIC implies IIC,
there is a dictator i0 over X = (R++ × {0})n ∪ ({0} ×R++)n.
Let x, y ∈ X and RN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i ∈ N, xi.yi >
0 (meaning that the two bundles have a positive quantity for the same commodity).
One can construct z, w ∈ X and R0N ∈ Rn such that for every i ∈ N, either xi Pi yi
and xi P 0i zi P 0i wi P 0i yi, or yiRi xi and wi P 0i yiR0i xi P 0i zi. Because i0 is a dictator over X,
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z P 0w and by Weak Pareto, xP 0 z and wP 0 y. By transitivity, xP 0 y and by IIIC and
monotonicity of preferences, xP y.
Let x, y ∈ X andRN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0. One can construct z ∈ X such that
for every i ∈ N, yi.zi > 0 and either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yiRi xi Pi zi. By the above property,
one has z P y. By Weak Pareto, xP z, implying xP y. This shows that i0 is a dictator
over X.
Finally, by the same reasoning as the final step of the proof of Theorem 1, the dictator
over (D−∗,X) and the dictator over (Rn,X) must be the same agent. This completes the
proof of Theorem 2.
Again we briefly check the tightness of Theorem 2. For any RN ∈ D+∗ := Rn \ D−∗,
there exists i0(RN) ∈ N such that every K ⊆ L with K 6= ∅ is indispensable for Ri0(RN ).
We define the social ordering Ψ(RN) as follows. For all x, y ∈ Rcn+ , xR y if one of the
following conditions holds:
(i) RN ∈ D+∗, xi0(RN ), yi0(RN ) ∈ uci0(RN ) and x2R2 y2;
(ii) RN ∈ D+∗, xi0(RN ) ∈ uci0(RN ) and yi0(RN ) /∈ uci0(RN );
(iii) RN ∈ D+∗, xi0(RN ), yi0(RN ) /∈ uci0(RN ) and x1R1 y1;
(iv) RN ∈ D−∗ and x1R1 y1.
For every RN ∈ D+∗, this social ordering function is not dictatorial over ({RN},X) .
A variant of this example in which agent 2 in (i) is replaced by the agent of smallest
number (from 1 to n) in N∗(RN) would give non-dictatorship over (Rn, {x, y}) for every
pair {x, y} ⊆ Rcn+ \X, such that one does not have xi > yi for all i ∈ N or xi < yi for all
i ∈ N, or xi = yi for some i ∈ N.
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